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Abstract—The wide use of Multi-processing systems-on-chip
(MPSoCs) in embedded systems and the trend to increase the
integration between devices have turned these systems vulnerable
to attacks. Malicious software executed on compromised IP may
become a serious security problem. By snooping the traffic
exchanged through the Network-on-chip (NoC), it is possible
to infer sensitive information such as secrets keys. NoCs are
vulnerable to side channel attacks that exploit traffic interference
as timing channels. When multiple IP cores are infected, they
can work coordinately to implement a distributed timing attack
(DTA). In this work we present for the first time the execution of
a DTA and a secure enhanced NoC architecture able to avoid the
timing attacks. Results show that our NoC proposal can avoid
the DTA with an increase of only 1% in area and 0.8% in power
regarding the whole chip design.
Index Terms—Network-on-Chip, Security NoC, Timing Attack,
Timing Side-channel Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, MPSoCs are object of attacks. One of the most
dangerous attacks is the side-channel attack (SCA) [1] [2]. It
can be performed remotely by inferring sensitive information
through architecture behavior leakage, such as timing, schedul-
ing or communication addressing. Among these attacks, the
timing attack is most common [3] [4] [5].
When a sensitive application is mapped into an MPSoC, it
creates several sensitive communications between the IPs in-
volved. For example, one processing element that has sensitive
data requires to a secure processor to encrypt or decrypt such
information. Then, during the cipher algorithm execution, this
IP has to make several accesses to the shared memory, in order
to retrieve the pre-computed values used in such algorithms.
And, if there is a miss, the shared memory has to request data
for the main memory. In NoC-based MPSoCs, it is not possible
to directly access the information transmitted between the
IPs, not being able to perform attacks that listen the channel.
Therefore, an attacker needs to use indirect information that
reveals the system behavior. The timing attack in NoC aims to
infect an IP to sample the injection delay of its own packets
in a path that intersects a sensitive communication. Then, the
degradation of its own throughput can reveal the presence of
sensitive traffic. Therefore, knowing the access times of the
sensitive communication and the cipher algorithm used, the
attacker can infer the look-up tables accessed in memories in
order to discover the secret key [6].
When multiple IP cores are infected, they can work coordi-
nately to implement a distributed timing attack (DTA). DTA
threat model requires that the attacker controls data injection of
the malicious IP and knows some characteristics of the MPSoC
system. Hence, the attacker can force its communication flow
to share the same NoC resources than the sensitive flow.
Although this kind of attack is object of recent research,
DTA has not been demonstrated in MPSoCs yet. However, the
threat is real and new security mechanism must be developed
[7]. Network-on-Chip (NoC), as the communication structure
of the MPSoC, plays an important role regarding systems
security. Its main function in the system operation allows the
NoC to detect and avoid attacks. Previous works addressed the
timing attack protection by security enhanced NoCs [7] [8] [9].
They show that NoC can detect and protect the systems against
this kind of attacks. However, such approaches decrease the
overall system performance and they were not tested under a
DTA.
In this work we propose Gossip NoC, a security enhanced
NoC able to identify traffic anomalies and handle through
a distributed management scheme. Each router has a traffic
monitor to identify when there is a possible threat and send
a gossip alert. The neighbor routers receive the gossip mes-
sage, where each router can reinforce or ignore the message.
Reinforcement strategy reduces false positive detections. If an
attack is detected, the router changes the routing algorithm for
the packets that uses that path. Our work presents three main
contributions:
1) A DTA execution in an MPSoC environment;
2) a secure enhanced NoC architecture able to protect
against DTA; and
3) the gossip reinforcement strategy able to avoid false
positives attacks.
This paper is divided in six sections. Section II presents the
related works, regarding NoC protection mechanisms. Timing
Side Channel Attacks are presented in Section III. The Gossip
NoC proposal is presented in Section IV and the experiments
and results are shown in Section V. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Previous works [10] [11] [12] show that the NoC can be an
effective protection mechanism to the system. By monitoring
and controlling the data exchange inside the MPSoC, the
NoC can detect and avoid software-based attacks. Previous
works [7] [8] [9] and [13] addressed the NoC-based protection
against software-based SCA. Such works propose to modify
the arbitration and routing of sensitive traffic.
The works of [7] [8] propose the integration of hard QoS
mechanism to isolate the sensitive information. They include
temporal network partitioning, based on high [7] and bounded
[8] priorities arbitration schemes. Furthermore, the work of [9]
proposes random arbitration and adaptive routing as protection
techniques. On the other hand, multiple path communication
for sensitive flows is proposed by [13]. Despite their good
results, these previous works have two main drawbacks: i)
QoS approaches decrease the overall system performance;
ii) the system keep vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks; they are only capable to protect a system where only
a single attacker, located in the middle of the sensitive path,
is saturating the NoC traffic and sniffing the sensitive flow.
In order to overcome such drawbacks, in this work we
propose a distributed security mechanism, able to deal with
timing attack while introducing a lower impact on system
performance. Our approach handles distributed attacks, such
as performed by DTA, and also introduces a strategy to avoid
the false-positives detections.
III. DISTRIBUTED TIMING ATTACK (DTA)
A timing attack is a side-channel analysis that exploits
information leakage through computation or communication
timing behavior. Previous works have already shown methods
to attack computational and storage components by exploring
features such as cache miss rates [14] [15] or the time required
to perform floating point operations [16].
The work of [9] presented a scenario where a malicious
IP inside the MPSoC injects data to saturate a NoC path. As
a result, the attacker is able to measure the degradation of
its own throughput, in order to infer information about the
traffic that intersects the attackers router. Hence, the attacker
can discover the access pattern of a sensitive information.
The work of [9] demonstrated the SCA through a system that
tracks the communication between a crypto-processor and its
cache memory. In order to improve the effectiveness of the
attack, multiple cores can be infected. Compared to the single
timing attack, the DTA decreases the computation and storage
requirements of the malicious IPs. This work presents, for the
first time, a DTA at NoC, where it divides the malicious IPs
into two groups:
• Injectors, responsible for injecting data in the NoC at high
data rates with the objective to increase the congestion
of the attacked path;
• Observers, responsible to inject data at lower data rates
and to sample the delay of their own packets with the
objective to collect the throughput traces of the attacked
path.
Besides, the malicious packets do not necessarily violate the
security policies of the NoC (source/destiny/size) to execute
the attack, so often these packets can not be detected by a
secure enhanced NoC. The following subsections will present
the threat model and the three stages to develop such attack:
i) infection, which inserts a malicious software (malware) in
the target system; ii) calibration, used to adjust the attack pa-
rameters; and iii) execution and cryptanalysis, which develops
the attack, data collection and post-processing.
A. Threat Model
In order to execute a DTA in a NoC, the following condi-
tions are required:
1) The attacker can infect more than two processors of the
MPSoC through a malicious software.
2) The attacker knows where the target elements are located
in the NoC (logical address).
Fig. 1: MPSoC system running a sensitive application, after
infection stage.
3) The attacker knows the topology and routing algorithm
of the communication infrastructure.
4) The attacker observation path intersects the sensitive
path.
5) Infected IPs are close (few hops) to the sensitive path.
B. First Stage - Infection
The purpose of this step is to spread a malicious application
into MPSoC. This application uses the infected IP to transmit
the malware and to create the two types of malicious IP -
injector and observer. Figure 1 presents an MPSoC system
composed of CPUs, shared memories, peripherals (IO) and
one main memory access; all integrated through a 2D mesh
NoC. It also shows three communication flows, two regarding
a sensitive application and one regarding the attacker flow.
The sensitive application starts with an encryp-
tion/decryption running on the CPU (IP 12). This CPU
accesses a shared memory (IP 11), in order to retrieve the
look-up tables used in the cipher algorithm. When there is a
cache miss at this memory, it creates another communication
flow requesting data for the main memory, addressed as IP
0. Also, Figure 1 presents three malicious IPs, one observer
at IP 8 (labeled as OBS) and two injectors at IP 9 and 14
(labeled INJ). These malicious IPs will create the attacker
communication flow to IP 4, a normal CPU, with the objective
to congest the path used for cache misses requests.
C. Second Stage - Calibration
The work in [17] presents an exploration of the com-
munication behavior in a NoC-based MPSoC over several
applications from SPLASH-2 and PARMACS benchmarks.
According [17], the synchronization-intensive applications can
reach 70% of injection rate. Thus, NoCs designers configure
the communication structure to meet the requirements, and
avoid throughput penalties. In this case, DTA have to congest
the target path at least at 70% of the bandwidth. Then, the
normal traffic will use the last 30% of the available bandwidth
and influence directly the throughput of the observer.
Another important issue is that the sensitive information is
characterized by long packets [18]. This means that during
a burst communication of a sensitive packet in the NoC, a
significant part of the bandwidth is consumed. This value
depends on the cipher block sizes and NoC enlace size, and
at our environment it can represent 10% of the bandwidth.
This means that the sensitive packets degrade the throughput
more abruptly than a normal packet. Therefore, the objective
of the calibration is to define a DTA configuration that creates
a congestion high enough to put in evidence any packet in the
target path, but lower enough to distinguish between a normal
and sensitive packet.
The calibration stage is performed exploring different attack
scenarios, varying the number of injectors and the injection
data rate. In each scenario, the injectors have to respect an
injection time ti and a waiting time tw, used to guarantee
a clear observation of the contribution of the injectors in the
observer throughput. It is performed until the mean throughput
during ti has a low variance. Figure 2 presents a part of four
calibration scenarios merged in the same time line. The mean
throughput of each case is represented by the black dash.
On the left side of the Figure 2, three throughput zones are
presented:
• Saturation: Difficulty to distinguish the normal and sen-
sitive packets. Above 90% of the bandwidth.
• Congestion: Different behaviors of throughput can be
observed (big and small packets). Between 70% and 90%
of the bandwidth.
• Traffic not intense: Difficulty to identify the falls of
throughput, because collision of the packets hardly oc-
curs. Bellow 70% of the bandwidth.
Four calibration were performed and can be observed in the
Figure 2. The first scenario, Figure 2(a), used three injectors
injecting packets at 50% of data rate and one observer. The
second, Figure 2(b), used three injectors at 30% of data rate.
Since the throughput presented in Figure 2(a) and (b) was
in the saturation zone, the next two calibrations reduced the
number of injectors. The third scenario, Figure 2(c), used
two injectors at 50% of data rate; and Figure 2(d), used two
injectors at 30%.
The scenario of Figure 2(d) is the best configuration for the
attack, because it degrades the throughput at lower levels but
stays in the congestion zone. This feature allows the observer
to detect when a sensitive packet is passing through the path.
The throughput choosen in the calibration step is used as the
threshold of the attack. Any throughput result at execution
stage bellow the threshold will be considered as a possible
sensitive packet.
The ti and tw times of the calibration step depend on the
NoC characteristics. High capacity NoCs require more time to
achieve saturation, that is to fill the buffers and to generate a
congestion.
D. Third Stage - Execution and Cryptanalysis
Once calibrated, the injectors will send packets, the ob-
server will sample and store the throughput results. Regarding
the execution of DTA, there are several types of attacks that
can be made through the timing analysis. In this work, we
target the strategy to infer the access pattern of a memory
that contains the lockup tables of the cryptographic IP. This
is the same attack strategy presented by [9], but we extend
the approach to a distributed attack. On this scenario, DTA
requires the injectors configured with the values determined at
Fig. 2: Throughput Trace from observer attacker. Four calibra-
tion scenarios: a) Three injectors at 50%; b) Three injectors
at 30%; c) Two injectors at 50%; d) Two injectors at 30%.
calibration step, and only one observer to collect the memory
throughput results.
The last part of DTA execution regards to the cryptanalysis,
which employs a mathematical algorithm to correlate the
timing results collected by the monitor to infer an unknown
key. Some techniques are demonstrated at [6], [19] and [20].
IV. GOSSIP NETWORK-ON-CHIP
In this work we propose the Gossip NoC, a security en-
hanced architecture to deal with single and distributed timing
attacks. It is composed by a traffic monitor and a counter-
measure technique at each router, being a distributed security
mechanism. The name gossip is proposed because the traffic
monitors generate alert messages to other routers, creating
a gossip message. Besides, in order to avoid false-positives
the router uses a reinforcement parameter, called gossip con-
fidence, to decide when to accept the gossip message. If an
attack is detected, the router changes the routing algorithm to
the packets that wants to go through the path under attack.
Therefore, Gossip NoC combines two strategies to protect
the MPSoC against DTA: i) Detection, which includes the
bandwidth monitoring and the gossip message generation in
the presence of an abnormal behavior; and ii) protection,
triggered when any gossip message is received and which is
able to modify the route of the packet.
A. Gossip Architecture
The gossip router microarchitecture is shown in Figure 3. It
is based on a typical NoC router composed by routing scheme
(XY and YX), Round-Robin arbiter and FIFO memory. Ad-
ditional three main components are integrated:
• Gossip In Block (1) : It controls the internal state of the
gossip router according the values of the input signals
(outputGossip). When the number of gossip messages
received from neighbor routers overcomes the gossip
confidence, an attack is confirmed. As a result the routing
of the packets is modified.
• Gossip Logic (2) : It commutes the incoming packets.
Under attack, the traffic is commuted according to the
YX algorithm (RouteType). Otherwise the XY route is
implemented.
• Gossip Generator (3) : It monitors the traffic bandwidth.
When it exceeds a protection bandwidth threshold, a
Fig. 3: Gossip router microarchitecture: (1) Gossip In Block;
(2) Gossip Logic; (3) Gossip Generator.
signal indicating a possible attack is activated and trans-
mitted (inputGossip) to the Gossip In Block of all the
neighbor routers. This configures a gossip message.
B. Gossip Functionality
Gossip router modifies the XY routing algorithm to the YX
in the presence of an attack. As a result, the malicious IP that
was collecting information (observer) in such a path is now
unable to complete the attack, since the sensitive information
is using another route. The usage of XY and YX routing
algorithms together is guaranteed as deadlock and livelock free
[21] [22].
However, attackers may notice the change of routing algo-
rithm. In order to overcome such a drawback, it is required
that the MPSoC limits the number of processing elements that
can execute external tasks, and thus the possible attackers. As
Gossip NoC changes the route during runtime, the attacker
needs to create, simultaneously, two zones of congestion (one
for each possible route). Thus, requiring several infected IPs
to accomplish this goal.
During design phase, two parameters have to be adjusted,
the throughput threshold and the gossip confidence. The
throughput value triggers a gossip message to the neighbor
routers. The gossip confidence defines the minimum number
of gossip messages required to activate the countermeasure
mechanism (routing algorithm modification).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The target MPSoC is composed by eight processing ele-
ments and eight shared memories, as shown in Figure 1, in-
terconnected by a 4x4 mesh-based NoC. The NoC is composed
by a 5-port router, with input buffers of eight flits, each flit of
32 bits, and using an XY as routing algorithm.
Our experimental environment implements the DTA to
measure the access times from a crypto-processing element
and its cache memory. As presented in [9], the objective of this
attack is to understand the access pattern of the memory that
stores the look-up tables with the pre-computed data used in a
cryptographic algorithm. This first experiment demonstrates
the effectiveness of DTA attack with an unprotected NoC.
Then, the second experiment presents protection against DTA
when Gossip NoC is used. The system was modeled and
simulated by the VHDL framework presented in [23]. The
unprotected NoC and Gossip NoC were synthesized to a 65nm
ASIC technology, in order to obtain information of overhead
in power and area.
A. DTA Experiment
The DTA performed the three stages described in Section
3. The calibration, depicted in Figure 2, presents four possible
scenarios, where (d) was chosen as the suitable value for
this attack. It has a mean throughput of 2.23 bps (bits per
cycle) during the injection times (ti). This value is used during
attack execution as the threshold throughput to detect possible
sensitive packets. Any throughput sample below 2.23 bps is
interpreted by the attacker as a possible memory access of the
crypto-processor.
The simulation used two injectors at a rate of 30%, the
observer at 15%, the crypto-processor at 10% and other IPs in
the system with random targets at 10% (communication noise).
Simulation results are presented in Figure 4 with 50,000
traces. It can be observed that in the first 3,000 samples the
throughput is high, at 16 bps, and after it falls to around 3 bps.
This phenomenon is called in this work as ”warm-up”, which
means that in the beginning of the simulation all buffers are
empty, and until they fill, the throughput does not fall. Also, in
Figure 4 a dashed line is presented, representing the threshold
of 2.23 bps.
Table I presents the effectiveness, success rate, false-positive
(FP) and false-negative (FN) results of the observer attacker
measures during DTA. The effectiveness is the quantity of
real sensitive data identified by the attack correctly, in this
experiment about 59%. The success rate of the attack is the
percentage of the points below the threshold that corresponds
to a sensitive data. A success rate of 97% means that almost
all points below the threshold correspond to the sensitive data,
being a very reliable information. This reflects the results of
FP, where only 3% of the identified points were a mistake. The
FN represent the part of the sensitive information invisible to
the attacker. These results used an error margin of one packet
transmission to deal with a variance between the sample and
sensitive packet, and the warm-up phase was not considered.
The protection strategies against timing attacks, such as
random arbitration and adaptive routing proposed by [9]
Fig. 4: Trace throughput of the DTA on the memory access
pattern. Threshold identified in the dashed line.
TABLE I: Effectiveness (% of matches) of DTA using a
threshold of 2.23 bps.
Effectiveness Success Rate FP FN
DTA 59.63% 96.92% 3.07% 40.36%
are not effective against DTA. Random arbitration protection
highly depends on the randomness degree. Observers can
disclosure the pseudo-random sequence of the arbiter during
the cryptanalysis stage. Adaptive routing protection can be also
avoided if multiple observers are operating simultaneously in
the possible paths. Therefore, the distributed aware protection
mechanisms becomes mandatory.
B. Gossip NoC Experiment
The same DTA attack and configuration was developed in
the system with the Gossip NoC. The simulation results are
presented in Figure 5. The warm-up phase can be observed in
the firsts 3000 cycles. After the warm-up, the throughput falls
to 2.5 bps, being a similar behavior from DTA attack without
protection. However, after cycle 4000 the behavior of the
throughput changes again, bringing the mean throughput lower
than the threshold, marked in Figure 5 as the first anomaly
detection. Then, after the cycle 15000 a new behavior occurs,
where the mean throughput increases above the threshold,
marked as the second anomaly detection. This indicates that
Gossip NoC identified anomalies (high bandwidth usage) in
the traffic and changed two times the route of neighbor packets
(at cycle 4000 and at cycle 15000), altering all communica-
tions behavior.
The first changing in behavior (at cycle 4000) created an
increase of communication above expected from observers
router. This happened because the gossip routers detected
not only the attackers traffic as anomalies, but the normal
ones too. So, routers near the observer were triggered with
gossip messages and changed the route. Then, because of
this increase, at time 15000, the observer route identified this
intense traffic as another threat, creating new gossip messages,
and reducing the congestion (increasing the throughput) as a
consequence.
In this experiment, what really happened with the sensitive
packets was that they were rerouted at cycle 6000. This
information can be confirmed with the results presented in
Table II. It confirms the fact that these packets changed their
routes, not passing in observer router, because 91% of the
sensitive data was not identified, achieving an effectiveness of
only 6.62%. The success rate of the attack decreased to 7% due
to the traffic noise inserted by the gossip router mistakes, that
change the route of normal packets around, inserting wrong
data in observer measurements. So, except these 7% of attack
Fig. 5: Trace throughput of the distributed timing attack under
Gossip NoC. Gossip confidence of 1.
success rate, the throughput degradation was not representing
sensitive information.
The reason that normal packets were considered a threat by
the Gossip NoC is because the gossip confidence parameter
used was too low. It used the value 1 as parameter, where
this value refers the quantity of gossip messages required to
consider a threat. This means that even high used paths by
normal packets could be considered anomalies by the system.
To avoid these false alarms, the gossip confidence has to be
adjusted, in this case, increased. Therefore, another experiment
with Gossip NoC was developed, increasing this parameter, in
order to understand this reinforcement strategy potentials.
The result of the experiment with a gossip confidence of ten
(10 gossip messages to believe that is a threat) are presented
in the Figure 6. The throughput trace depicted seems to be the
same from a typical DTA attack, but the results of effectiveness
in Table III demonstrates that the protection mechanism was
effective. The throughput trace did not show changing in
behavior because the Gossip identified only the attacked path,
and rerouted successfully the sensitive path. However, increase
the gossip confidence from one to ten allows the attacker
to double its effectiveness, from 6% to 13%. This happened
because the Gossip NoC needed more time to reinforce the
fact that there was an attack, given more time to the attacker.
Therefore, gossip confidence presents a trade-off between the
impact on the normal behavior of the system and the protection
effectiveness.
In order to understand this trade-off, Figure 7 presents
the results of DTA effectiveness when changing the gossip
confidence parameter from 1 to 100. Simulations executed
changing this parameter with a step of 1 from 1 until 20,
and after that the step was 10. The last point represents the
value where there is no protection, because the DTA achieves
its normal effectiveness of 59%. It can be observed that the
increase of gossip confidence decreases the protection linearly.
However, as presented in the Figure 6, a gossip confidence of
10 already has no much impact in communications behavior.
Therefore, it should never be a value near 1, because it creates
much false-positive detections, but neither a high one, because
it decreases the protection level. The proper value has to be
a lower value, from 10 to 40, in order to maintain the attack
TABLE II: Effectiveness (% of matches) of DTA using a
threshold of 2.23 bps under Gossip NoC.
Effectiveness Success Rate FP FN
DTA 6.62% 6.56% 93.43% 93.37%
Fig. 6: Trace throughput of the DTA under Gossip NoC.
Gossip confidence of 10.
TABLE III: Effectiveness (% of matches) of DTA using a
threshold of 2.23 bps under Gossip NoC. Gossip confidence
of 10.
Effectiveness Success Rate FP FN
DTA 13.55% 19.06% 80.93% 86.44%
Fig. 7: Effectiveness of DTA for 50000 traces according
different gossip confidence configurations.
TABLE IV: Synthesis Results for the Typical and Gossip
router.
Unprotected NoC Gossip NoC % Overhead
Area (um2) 2632 3189 21.16%
Power (mW) 2.073 2.409 16.2%
effectiveness below 30%, which means, to avoid that the attack
acquires much data.
C. Synthesis Results
Table IV presents synthesis results of a unprotected router
and Gossip router under 65 nm technology and 1GHz as
reference clock frequency. Results show that each gossip
router has 21% area and 16% power overhead when compared
to the typical router. In spite of the high percentage, the
interconnection network represents only 5% of the whole
MPSoC system, being the Gossip NoC an increase of 1% in
area and 0.8% in power regarding the whole chip design.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the Gossip NoC, a security enhanced
NoC architecture able to protect MPSoCs against DTA. By
using distributed monitor and traffic management, it is possible
to detect possible attacks and deflect the sensitive traffic.
The proposed architecture was capable to avoid DTA, since
the sensitive data was reflected, resulting in a reduction of
effectiveness from 59.63% to 6.62% in a 50000 traces sce-
nario. Besides, for the first time it was presented a NoC-based
mechanism able to avoid false positives attacks by using gossip
confidence threshold. Results showed that a difference of 10
times in this parameter can reduce drastically the false alarms
in the system, but also allows the attacker to acquire double
of information. Gossip NoC presented a low cost architecture
solution with an increase of 1% in area and 0.8% in power
regarding the whole chip design.
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